


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
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
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


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CALCUTTA ORIENTAL SERIES.

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UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA

INTER-STATE RELATIONS
IN
ANCIENT INDIA
PART I

BY

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SETTLERS,' ETC.

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TO THE
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v.1

CARPENTER



PREFACE

The subject of this volume *viz.*, inter-state relations in ancient India, is evidently very wide, including not merely those inter-state relations that were regulated by inter-state laws corresponding to the inter-national laws of modern times, but also those that fell outside the said laws. Light is thus attempted to be thrown on the two fields of regulated and unregulated relations in order that a comparative estimate may be made of each in contrast with the other. The recondite nature of the task requires among others a thorough study of the latter half of the Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra which happens to be the toughest portion of the whole work. Much labour had to be devoted to an intimate acquaintance with this portion of the work through the original. Its English translation has, I must admit with

gratitude to its learned translator, helped me a good deal in overcoming many difficulties within a shorter time than I could have done without its aid ; but at the same time, I have to mention without the least intention to detract from the credit of the very useful pioneering performnace of the said translator, that there have been very many occasions for me in the course of my research to differ from the translation. In this volume has been worked out only a fraction of the subject, and hence all the points of difference will not be found in it. The critical perusal of the said latter half of the Kauṭīliya was undertaken with the object that generalizations made from one of its parts might not run the risk of being contradicted by another. The subject-matter of this portion of the Kauṭīliya is hardly met with in any other Sanskrit text that I know of with the same elaboration of details, and hence, references to other Sanskrit works in my treatment of the subject are few and far between. It must not however be sup-

posed that I have ignored the evidences available from other quarters, either law-codes, epics, purāṇas, dramas, codes of polity or documents of any other description. On the other hand, I have always kept my mind on a keen look-out for all kinds of evidences on my subject and would welcome them whenever fresh ones come or are brought within my reach.

The task of refutation of certain opinions rendered current by previous writers who had occasion to touch the subject of "statal circle" and such other topics pertaining to the present subject rendered my task very difficult. The opinions have become deep-rooted not only by the length of time they are obtaining currency but also by the eminence of one or two of the writers who have lent them their support. In the facility with which the finished products of research are perused, we are apt to lose sight of the great difficulties besetting the stemming of current opinions or the elicitation of facts and generalizations from a con-

fusing mass of evidences and hence I make no apology for pointing out the following:—

(1) The various states forming the maṇḍala (statal circle) have not hitherto been regarded as a collocation general in character and applicable to the case of any state whatsoever, surrounded by the rest with mutual feelings of friendliness or enmity issuing from the principle of spacial adjacency.

(2) The madhyama state has been hitherto rendered as “intermediary” signifying the misconception about its real character.

(3) The state called udāsīna has also been wrongly rendered as “neutral” as the result of a mistaken notion about its position and function in the statal circle.

(4) A “yātavya” is not the same as “ari,” which again is not identical with “ṣatru.” Though the differences among them are not clear in the Kāmandakīya, they do exist and appear from the Kauṭīliya. In the English translation of the latter, the differences have not been clearly kept in view.

(5) The term sandhi bears in reality various meanings and cannot be rendered by the expression "treaty of peace." Even in the Kāmandakiya, the term has been in a place used in the sense of alliance. In the English translation, the various meanings have been missed, giving rise to confusion in several chapters.

(6) The daṇḍopanata and the daṇḍo-pānayī are totally different individuals and the confusion between them appearing in the the English translation should be guarded against.

(7) One is led to suppose from the English translation that a state could be attacked by another state without any previous provocation. I have attempted to prove the supposition as baseless.

A large portion of this volume formed part of the approved theses submitted to the Calcutta University in conformity with the rules regulating the Premchand Roychand Scholarship.

As the second edition of the Kauṭīliya.

has appeared very recently, and the greater portion of this work was finished in 1918, the references to the Sanskrit text in this portion have been equated to those to the second edition.

96, AMHERST STREET, }
Calcutta, 1919. } NARENDRA NATH LAW.

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INTER-STATE RELATIONS

IN

ANCIENT INDIA.

SECTION I.

A. It was usual with the ancient Hindu writers on Polity to commence their discourse on inter-state relations by

The founda-
tions of the
statel circle.

imagining a number of states with special names and inclined to one another as friends or

enemies owing to their mutual spacial correlation. The adjacency of


Adjacency
creating enmity.

one state to another, which

is obviously a fruitful source of rivalry

SEC. I. 2 INTER-STATE RELATIONS

and differences, was taken to be the determiner of their mutual attitude. If A be the state with which we start our discourse and B its immediate neighbour, it would be allowable to infer



that ordinarily they would be hostile to each other. The same inference applies to A's relation to any other of the states which like B may happen to be its immediate neighbour. The territories of the first neigh-

bours of A therefore constitute a zone of natural enmity¹ towards A. Not so the zone of second neighbours indicated by C. Cs being the immediate neighbours of the Bs are hostile to them and therefore friendly to A. The second zone therefore is one of natural friendliness² towards A. For the present purpose, we need take into consideration A the central state (*vijigīshu*)³ and one state from each of the zones, keeping their adjacency intact. Let us put down in a separate diagram this set of ABC, and by applying the aforesaid determiner of friendliness


Two zones of enmity and friendliness.

¹ "Tasya samantato maṇḍalībhūtā bhūmyantarā ari-prakṛtiḥ"—Kauṭīliya, Bk. VI, Chap. 2, p. 258. Within this zone, congenital enemies (*sahaja*) are created by common lineage, and acquired enemies (*kṛitrima*) by actual opposition or causing of opposition (Kauṭīliya, Bk. VI, Chap. 2, p. 258).

² "Tathaiva bhūmyekāntarā mitra-prakṛtiḥ"—*Ibid.* Within this zone also congenital and acquired friends are distinguished (Kauṭīliya, Bk. VI, Ch. 2, p. 258).

³ *Vijigīshu* literally means a state bent on conquests. But as this desire is not the peculiar characteristic of A alone, it is better to attach to the term some colourless signification and to render it accordingly.

and enmity, add D, E and F to their
 Further appli- number. D being in the second
 cation of the zone from B would be its
 principle. friend, and E and F, for the same reason,



friendly to C and D respectively. We can
 now name the states as follows :—

- (1) A = Central state (vijigishu);
 ϵ_1 (2) B = Enemy (i.e., of A) [ari];
 ζ_1 (3) C = Friend (i.e., of A) [mitra];
 ϵ_2 (4) D = B's friend i.e., enemy's friend
 (ari-mitra);

from A's
 viewpoint

ϵ_2 (5) E=C's friend *i.e.*, friend's friend (mitra-mitra);

ϵ_3 (6) F=D's friend *i.e.*, friend of the enemy's friend (ari-mitra-mitra).


It will be seen that C, D, E, F, are equally divided among themselves as adherents of A

Four types of states in front.

and B; for in the ultimate analysis, C and E would be on the

side of A, and D and F on that of B. It was

6 states
Equally divided
into opposing
camps.



not generally thought necessary to add to the chain of friendly and hostile states any

more, for inter-state relations were not considered generally to bring into operation the active friendliness or hostility of a larger number of states in a particular direction.

In the opposite direction, however, it would be necessary to take into account a

Four states in
the rear.

number of states for the reason that if the *casus belli* occurs between A and B, and they be the actual belligerents, A may be attacked and helped from behind in the same way as we have supposed in B's case. Four states are therefore set down in the rear, their attitude towards the central state being determined by the usual principle. These states are called



(7) A = Rear-enemy [pārshni-grāha (lit. "heel-catcher")];

- (8) B = Rear-friend (ākṛanda);
 (9) C = Rear-enemy's friend (pārshṇi-grāhāsāra);
 (10) D = Rear-friend's friend (ākṛandāsāra);

Thus the two belligerents A and B have each two adherents in front and two in the rear, the total number including the belligerents themselves being ten.

The reasons for supposing the belligerents as adjacent states and not belonging to

separated "zones" are perhaps

Why suppose
the belligerents
to be adjacent?

(1) adjacency was the most prolific source of jealousy and

enmity, (2) the waging of war between two distant states with one or more territories separating them rendered the outbreak of war a difficult matter until the interposing states were persuaded to allow them a free passage of troops and all other necessities of war through their territories. This was rendered difficult by the fact that the states of the first and every alternate zone of each of them are naturally

hostile to it, and should they be persuaded by money or otherwise to admit such passage, severance of supply and communication might have been forthcoming at any moment; for the hostile states could not be fully trusted, and their temporary accession to a demand might ultimately prove to be a trap for the hazarding parties. (3) If however the hazarding party was very powerful, he might subdue first the interposing states and reach its distant enemy; but such cases must be rare. (4) If the interposing hostile states were won over by money or prospect of material gains to fight on the side of the attacking party against its distant enemy, the situation would then reduce into one of adjacency of the central state and its enemy, alliance having extended the former's range of hostile activities to the latter's door.

In these circumstances, it was reasonable to put down the belligerents as adjacent

states and determine the mutual attitude of the surrounding territories by the application of the principle of adjacency as the cause of enmity, a principle that has not perhaps yet lost its force.

To the types of friendly and hostile states already named were added two more *viz.*,

Two more states within the first zone-

Madhyama and Udāsīna. The

former is situated within the first zone of both the central

state and its enemy, and is therefore within the zone of enmity to each of them. But as expressed enmity to one of them results in friendliness to the other, none of them can consider Madhyama as friend or foe until its word, or action crystalizes its position. The texts lay down that it helps the central state and its enemy if allied, and can help or destroy each of them when not combined. From this issues the corollary that the strength of this state is much greater than that of either the central power or its enemy but less than their conjoint

SEC. I. 10 INTER-STATE RELATIONS

resources¹ (henceforth, we shall call it the medium power or state). The Udāsina (henceforth to be termed super-power or state) is the strongest power we have to imagine within the first zone of the central state. It is laid down that the super-power takes a friendly attitude to-

¹ The Kauṭīliya (Bk. VI, ch. 2, p. 259) has this passage "ari-vijigīshvor bhūmyantarāḥ samhatāsamhatayoranugrahasamartho nigrahe chāsamhatayormadhyamaḥ." The expression samhatāsamhatayoranugrahasamarthaḥ is ambiguous in as much as it may be made to signify : (I) "can help the central state and its enemy both when allied with each other, and when not so allied"; (II) "can help the central state or its enemy both when allied with other power or powers, and when not so allied."

The first meaning gains support from the "Upādhyāya-Nirapekshasāriṇī" commentary (Bibl. Indica) on sarga 8, ślk. 18 of the Kāmandakīya, and the second meaning from Śaṅkarārya's commentary on the same.

The merit of the first interpretation is that it indicates the measure of strength of the madhyama while the second leaves it obscure. It may be objected that the central state and its enemy cannot easily be transformed into allies which the interpretation contemplates. To this the reply may be that the alliance (though it is not an impossibility) is suggested only to show that, should they be allied, the madhyama single-handed will not dare offend them both simultaneously but


wards the three powers when combined and can at pleasure help or destroy each of them when separate. This gives rise to the position that its strength is less than the combined strength of the central state, its enemy, and the medium state, and necessarily much greater than the individual power of each of them.¹

rather will turn to help them. This indicates that the strength of the madhyama is greater than each of the central state and its enemy but less than their combined resources. That such a measure of strength in the madhyama was intended to be conveyed by the political thinkers of yore may be inferred not only from the name madhyama but also from the location of a higher power than madhyama within the first zone of the central state. This power is called udāsīna (literally "seated on a height") and is the highest power that we have to keep in view within the aforesaid first zone. With reference to the central state or its enemy on the one hand, and the udāsīna on the other, the madhyama comes as a *state of medium strength* and hence its name.

¹ Kauṭīliya (Bk. Vī, ch. 2, p. 259) has "ari-vijigīshu-madhyamāṇāṃ bahiḥ prakṛitibhyo balabattaraḥ.....". The Bibl. Indica commentary on Kāmandakīya, sarga 8, śloka 19 which uses the words "maṇḍalād bahiḥ" interprets "bahiḥ" into "vijigīshorbbhūmyanantaraḥ" i.e., within the first zone of the central state.

SEC. I. 12 INTER-STATE RELATIONS

[The accompanying diagram shows the location of the medium and super states].



The Madhyama is so called from its strength being intermediate between the

central state or its enemy on the one hand, and udāsīna on the other, the last being the strongest power within the first zone, within which therefore three states, besides the central, of gradually higher strength are contemplated *viz.*, enemy, medium, and super. This zone as already discussed is the region where the chances of war between the central and other states are the greatest, and hence the location of two states of higher grades of strength within it with their special names to meet emergencies of reference to such powers in the discourse to follow.

To render udāsīna by "neutral" and madhyama by "mediatory" *i.e.*, as effecting a mediation between the central states and its enemy would be wide of the mark. The significance of their names has already been indicated. Mediation need not be the special work of a particular neighbour, nor neutrality the special attitude of one of the aforesaid eight states in the hostilities between the central power and its enemy.

Why madhyama
and udāsīna are
so called?

SEC. I. 14 INTERSTATE RELATIONS

A state was analysed by Hindu statesmen into seven constituents *viz.*,

Seven constituents or sources of strength of a state.

- (1) Svāmī (sovereign),
- (2) Amātya (minister),
- (3) Janapada (territory with the subjects),
- (4) Durga (fort),
- (5) Koṣa (Treasure),
- (6) Daṇḍa (army), and
- (7) Mitra(ally).

To gauge the strength of a state, it is necessary to measure the individual excellence of each of the seven constituents. The first constituent, svāmī, signifies the person holding the supreme authority in a state, and in a monarchy, the king personally. The excellences of these constituents as enumerated in the Kauṭīliya¹ make it clear that svāmī signifies a king or any other person in supreme authority in a state, and not any constitutional body or bodies in which the sovereign power may be vested. In

¹ Kauṭīliya, Bk. VI, ch. 1, p. 255.

the above scheme of twelve states, each has its svāmī; and if the central sovereign or his enemy wants to measure the ally-strength of the other before taking any important political action, the aforesaid attitudes ear-marked for the several states may well furnish a basis upon which to calculate roughly the number of his allies. The above calculation will have to be supplemented by the gauging of strength of each state from the information previously collected as to the excellences of each of its first six constituents.¹

The twelve states with five inner constituents of each (the first constituent svāmī being merged in the state, and the seventh mitra in the allies among the twelve states) compose a maṇḍala (circle), the twelve states being called the sovereign-elements (rāja-prakṛiti), and the sixty constituents the resource-elements (dravya-prakṛiti), the total

The sovereign-
elements and
the resource-ele-
ments.

¹ The seventh constituent is now left out, as it has been taken into account already.

number of the two kinds of elements being seventy-two [$12 + (12 \times 5) = 72$].

A general consensus of opinion among the Hindu publicists accepts the above composition of the statal circle as sufficient for the needs of reference to or delineation of the situations arising among the states in their mutual intercourse, the components of the circle with their defined correlation and special nomenclature furnishing the Other schemes of maṇḍala. basal concepts and terminology for the performance of the afore-said task with ease and precision. There were various opinions inclining to an extension of the range of the statal circle or a different arrangement of its components for the same purpose *e.g.*, (1) the 72 elements form four maṇḍalas of 18 elements each [the central state with a friend, and friend's friend with inner constituents of each are equal to $(3 + 15 = 18)$ elements composing the first maṇḍala; the second, third and fourth maṇḍalas being similarly formed by the enemy, medium, and super states with a

friend and friend's friend of each].¹ (2) The central state, enemy, friend, rear-enemy, medium, and super states form a circle of six sovereign-elements according to Puloman and Indra.²

A list of other opinions is given below.³

¹ Kauṭīliya, Bk. VI, Ch. 2, p. 259. This corresponds to Maya's view in the Kāmandakīya, sarga 8, ślk. 20 calling the four principal states mūla-prakṛiti (root-elements). The other elements would be called śākhā-prakṛiti (branch-elements).

² Kāmandakīya, VIII, 21. The resource-elements have not been calculated.

³ (a) Maya (second view) : the usual 12 sovereign-elements with an ally and an enemy of each= $[12+(12 \times 2)=36$ sovereign-elements]. *Ibid.*, VIII, 23.

(b) Bṛihaspati : 12 sovereign elements+an enemy of central state+an enemy of enemy+a friend as well as an enemy of each of the latter two= $12+1+1+4=18$ sovereign-elements.

Ibid., VIII, 26.

(c) Kavayaḥ (the wise) : 18 sovereign-elements mentioned in (b)+5 resource-elements of each= $18+90=108$ (both kinds of elements). *Ibid.*, VIII, 27.

(d) Viśālāksha : 18 sovereign-elements+an ally and an enemy of each= $18+36=54$ sovereign-elements.

Ibid., VIII, 28.

(e) 54 sovereign-elements mentioned in (d)+5 resource-elements of each= $54+5 \times 54=324$ (both kinds of elements). Kāmandakīya, VIII, 29 [M. N. Dutt's translation of this pas-

The excellences of the seven constituents are indicated in the Kauṭīliya.¹ (1) Those of the *sovereign* are : (a) The *inviting* qualities (abhigāmikā-guṇa),—of very high descent, favoured by destiny (daiva-sampanna), intelligent (buddhi-sampanna), steady (in weal or woe), [sattva-sampanna], seeing through people old in wisdom, virtuous, truthful, non-contradictory, grateful, having large aims, highly energetic, prompt, able to control neighbouring states, resolute, served by good men, and self-controlled.²

(b) The *intellectual* qualities (prajñā-guṇa),—desiring to hear what is worth hear-

sage at p. 90 is incorrect. He refers to "three hundred and twenty-four monarchies" which is likely to mislead a reader].

In this way, the varying speculations of the ancient Hindu publicists mention 14, 6, 36, 21, 48, 10, 60, 30, 2, and even 1 element (*Ibid.*, VIII, 30-40), the generally accepted view as already pointed out being that of 12 sovereign-elements.

(*Ibid.*, VIII, 41).

¹ Kauṭīliya, Bk. VI, ch. 1, pp. 255, 256.

² I have consulted Śaṅkarārya's comentary as well as that called "Upādhyāya-Nirapekshasāriṇī" on ślokas 6-8 of the 4th sarga of the Kāmandakīya in translating the above passages of the Kauṭīliya.

ing, hearing it, understanding, retaining in memory, discriminating, deliberating, rejecting what does not appeal to reason, and adhering to what is regarded as best.¹

(c) The energetic qualities (*utsāha-guṇa*),—courageous, justly indignant, quick, and industrious.

(d) The personal qualities (*ātma-sampat*),—intelligent, bold in the refutation of arguments, with retentive memory, strong, towering, able to easily dissuade others from evil ways, proficient in arts, able to reward or punish for benefaction or injury in calamities, shameful,² far-sighted, able to utilize the advantages of time, place, and manly efforts, resorting timely to alliance, *vikrama*,³ concession, restraint upon actions and compacts, and turning into account the weaknesses

¹ Cf. *Kāmandakīya*, IV, 22, 23 with the aforesaid commentaries.

² The next expression in the text is not intelligible.

³ Including *prakāśa-yuddha* (open fight), *kūṭa-yuddha* (treacherous fight) and *tūshṇīm-yuddha* (secret fight). See *Kauṣīlya*, Bk. VII, ch. 6, p. 278.

of enemies ; reserved (*saṁvṛita*), noble-minded (*adīna*), treating jests with oblique looks and brow-beating,¹ devoid of evil passions, anger, avarice, idleness, frivolity, haste, and wickedness ; able, and talking with smile and dignity, and acting upon the advice of men old in wisdom.

(2) The excellences of *ministers* have been enumerated at the beginning, middle, and end of the *Kauṭīliya*.²

(3) The excellences of the *janapada* are :—extensive, self-sufficing, able to supply the needs of other states in their calamities, provided with sufficient means of protection and livelihood, (with subjects) hostile to inimical states, able to control the neighbouring states, devoid of miry, stony, saline, uneven, thorny lands as well as forests with

¹ “ *Abhihāśya-jihma-bhrukuṭīkshaṇa* ” (implying *abhihāśye* = *abhihāśya-vishaye*.)

² See *Kauṭīliya*, Bk. I, (*mantri-purohitotpattiḥ*), p. 15, and the next chapter, p. 17 ; the qualities of the *amātyas* lie scattered elsewhere in the work, the word referring to officials like *saṁāhatṛi* and *sannidhātṛi* and not to *mantrins* (councillors) alone.

ferocious animals; lovely, containing agricultural lands, mines, timber-and elephant-forests, inhabited by energetic people, provided with cattle, other animals, and well-protected pastures; not relying upon rain for irrigational purposes (*i.e.*, containing irrigational works), possessing land and water ways, large quantities of valuable and variegated articles of commerce, able to maintain army and bear taxes, inhabited by laborious tillers of the soil and numerous intelligent (*abālīṣa*) owners of properties, and containing numerous people of lower castes, and loyal and righteous citizens.

(4) The excellences of *forts* have been already mentioned.¹

(5) The excellences of the *treasure* are:—acquired honestly by the sovereign himself or his predecessors, containing large quantities of gold and silver, gold coins and varieties of big gems, and able to withstand long calamities and non-replenishment.

¹ Kauṭīliya, Bk. II (*durga-vidhānam*), p. 51; Bk. VII, ch. 10, pp. 292, 293.

(6) The excellences of the *army* are:—serving hereditarily, permanent, devoted, contented, maintaining wife and children, not dissatisfied (*avisamvādita*) in sojourns, irresistible everywhere, enduring, experienced in many battles, trained in all modes of fighting and skilful in the use of all sorts of weapons, never failing in adversity¹ (sharing equally as they do the weal and woe of the king) and composed mostly of Kshatriyas.

(7) The excellences of a *friendly state* are:—friendly from generation to generation, unchanging, devoted, liberal, and responding promptly to call for help.²

✓ The a scheme of maṇḍala of twelve states was, as we have just said, generally accepted, the needs of reference to particular states in a certain spacial or political

The uses of the scheme of maṇḍala and the seven constituents of state.

¹ For the meaning of *advaidhya*, cf. Kauṭīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 9, p. 289.

² These attributes of the friendly state have been dealt with at length at p. 289 of the Kauṭīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 9.

The Kāmandakīya dwells on the excellence of the state-

correlation, or of description of particular political situations being ordinarily satisfied by the scheme. All the twelve states composing the circle may not, in particular cases, be put to the necessity of siding with the one or the other of the warring parties, the activities being limited, say, to the second zone. In this case, only a few states of the circle may be noted in calculations of strength or other such fore-casts. The list of excellences of the seven constituents of the state furnish the criterion by which those constituents of the required states in the circle have to be judged; and the group of qualities of a particular constituent in the list shows the points with regard to which the enquiries require to be instituted. The final estimate shows the merit or deficiency of each constituent, and the total strength of the states, their weak and vulnerable points being

elements in sarga 4 and offers many parallels to statements in the Kautiliya.

exposed to view for the guidance of the inquirer. It may be mentioned in this connexion that the making of such estimates necessarily implies the agency of informants through whom accurate information as to the details of the constituents was procured. The scheme of the maṇḍala,

Their value for the practical politics of those days. The courses of action.

and the analysis of the state into its constituents with an enumeration of their excellences serving as criteria for estimates of strength of states, enabled a sovereign to take the course or courses of action to be detailed presently. These courses were analysed into (1) sandhi (including alliances, treaty of peace &c.), (2) vighraha (war), (3) āsana (halt), (4) yāna (attack). (5) saṁśraya (resigning oneself to another's protection), and (6) dvaidhībhāva (making alliance with one and fighting with another). They admit of certain combinations and include various sub-courses of action adopted in stated situations.

B. The six courses of action including their combinations and sub-

Objects in view
in inter-state re-
lations.

courses for particular inter-
state situations are the source

of vyāyāma and śama *i.e.*, exertion to create means for the beginnings of undertakings, and exertion to ensure the enjoyment of results of undertakings. In addition to human exertion, there is scope for the operation of providential forces in the creation of the conditions in which a state may be at any particular moment. The causes, therefore, that determine those conditions, are of two kinds, human (mānusha) and providential (daiva). The former lies in the pursuit of the right or wrong courses of action (naya and apanaya) and the latter in the favourable or unfavourable circumstances or forces of nature (aya and anaya).¹ The net result of the operation of the two sets of causes is the particular condition of the kingdom at any particular

¹ These forces and their effects are dealt with in a subsequent section on the vyasanas (calamities).

moment *viz*, deterioration (kshaya), stagnation (sthāna), or prosperity (vṛiddhi).¹ In other words, it is the aforesaid causes that bring about the weakness or vigour of each of the sovereign and resource-elements, upon which depends the total strength (śakti) of the state as well as the happiness of its citizens [sukha identified with siddhi (success)].² The prosperity of the state stands as the ideal and though the immediate result of every undertaking may not be conducive to this ideal; and it is impossible that it should be so—the final aim of persons at the helm of the state should be this and none other. Hence, temporary deterioration, or stagnation of the state is permissible if the ultimate issue of the actions be gainful.³

With reference to the central state, any other state may be superior (jyāyān), equal (sama), or inferior (hīna) in strength and prosperity. Efforts should be directed by

¹ Kauṭīliya, Bk. VI, ch. 2, pp. 257, 258.

² *Ibid.*, Bk. VI, ch. 2, p. 259.

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. VI, ch. 2, p. 262.

the above state towards the increase of its own strength in order that it might be superior to others in its maṇḍala.

It is mentioned in the Kauṭīliya that conformity with the advice of treatises on polity leads a self-controlled sovereign to greater and greater power and position, making him ultimately the ruler of the whole earth, while the reverse conduct on the part of even an emperor with dominion from sea to sea reduces him to miserable straits.¹ The statement may at first sight sound too much laudatory of treatises on polity and the efficacy of their rules and recommendations, but, yet, on closer observation, it cannot be said to be without a foundation. For, in those days, "jealous rivalry between two or more states, the awakening of ambition, craving for rich colonies, desire of a land-locked state for a sea-coast, endeavour of a hitherto minor state to become a world-power, ambition of dynasties or great

¹ *Ibid.*, Bk. VI, ch. 1, p. 257; Bk. I. vṛiddha-saṃyoga, p. 11.

politicians to extend and enlarge their influence beyond the boundaries of their own state, and innumerable other factors" were at work to create causes of war in the same way as they do at present. These causes, numerous as they are, must have been more prolific than now in view of the then state of inter-statal relations regulated by comparatively fewer laws and provided with smaller facilities for the pacific cessation of hostilities by inter-statally constituted means.¹ Hence, the out-breaks of hostilities were

¹ It should be noted that a state in calamities (vyasana) is called yātavya (lit. assailable *i.e.*, tottering) by Kauṭilya, who includes it in the list of the various kinds of hostile states (Kauṭilya, Bk. VI, ch. 2, p. 258). This may lend colour to the supposition that a 'tottering' state was generally thought to be assailable by another state without any preceding conflict. That such a supposition is baseless will be apparent from the following :—

(1) Kauṭilya says that a state in calamities can be protected or easily attacked. Kauṭilya, Bk. VIII, ch. 1, p. 319).

(2) A state in calamities is mentioned by Kauṭilya as yātavya with reference to another state on the assumption that ill-will exists between the two parties. Should they be friendly, the former would be protected instead of being attacked by the latter.

comparatively greater, furnishing opportunities to an aspiring sovereign for the extension of his territory or for other means of acquisitions. The sovereign to achieve the great results promised by the treatises on polity must be endued with the qualities inculcated by their writers. The onerous conditions made necessarily rare the existence of such sovereigns but nevertheless there is no reason to deny that the recommendations of the writers had no merit by virtue of their applicability to the condi-

(3) It is expressly laid down by Kauṣilya that writs (implying negotiation) are the root of peace and war between states [Kauṣilya, Bk. II (śāsanādhikāra), p. 70 ; Kauṣilya tells us that he wrote the chapter on royal writs not merely in accordance with all the śāstras (treatises on polity) but also the prevailing practices (prayoga) of the day. *Ibid.*, p. 75].

(4) If pratāpa means 'ultimatum' [see Kauṣilya, Bk. I (dūta-pranidhiḥ) p. 32], then it is evidence of the existence of negotiation before the declaration of war. Hence, it is not permissible to suppose that a state in calamities could be attacked by another state without any previous conflict. It was preceding conflict alone that justified an attack. A friendly state would, on the other hand, protect it in its sorry plight.

tions of internal and inter-statal politics of those days.

✓ Attack on a state by another merely because the former is weak and the latter strong was not justified by practice, though of course, a pretext put forward as a real cause for war might have been picked up for the opening
 ✕ of hostilities. Conflict must have preceded
 ✕ war, and there is, as has been shown already, no ground to suppose otherwise. This supposition is rendered firmer by the fact that there are means at the disposal of a very powerful sovereign to demand submission of other sovereigns far and near for reasons other than existing conflict. These means were provided by the politico-religious ceremonials of *rājasūya* and *aśvamedha* which could be performed at will with the said political object in view. But they could be utilized by those sovereigns alone who had already become powerful enough to dare and defy the active oppositions that were sure to follow the celebration of the ceremonies, and served more as ways of asserting power al-

ready acquired than as those of acquiring the power itself. The steps leading to world-power at the disposal of the humbler states aspiring to such power are thus described by Kauṭilya¹ :—

I. (1) The central state should, after subduing the 'enemy', try to subdue the medium state, and when successful in this attempt, the super state.

(2) The medium and super states being subjugated (by the first step), the central state should, in proportion to the increase of its power, subdue the other states within the first zone.² When these states are brought under subjection, the states within the other zones³ should be dealt with in the same way.

(3) When the whole statal circle has been put under the sway of the central state (by

¹ Kauṭilya, Bk. XIII, ch. 4, p. 406.

² "Ari-prakṛitiḥ" in the text refers to 'rāja-prakṛitiḥ' (sovereign-elements) within the first zone and not to the citizens of the states.

³ "Uttaraḥ-prakṛitiḥ" refers similarly to the sovereign-elements in the other zones of the statal circle.

the second step),¹ an amitra (enemy) [among the states faced next] should be 'squeezed'² by a śatru,³ or a śatru by a mitra (friend).

2/ ¹ The subjugation of the sovereign-elements of the statal circle brings the central state face to face with other states, if any, which will be either friendly or hostile, and dealt with in the above process.

² The word used in the text is sampīdana which is thus explained in the Kāmandakīya, sarga VIII, ślo. 58 : Pīdana is more serious than karśana (or karṣaṇa.) The latter is effected by causing the emaciation of the treasure and army together with the death of the high ministers of state. Pīdana being more serious than karśana includes acts much more oppressive. Śaṅkarārya explains it by "mūla-varja-deśa-vilopanam."

³ A śatru is thus described by Kauṭilya : "arisampadyuktaḥ sāmantaḥ śatruḥ" (a neighbouring state endued with ari-sampats is called śatru) [Kauṭilya, Bk. VI, ch. 2, p. 258.] The ari-sampats (or amitra-sampats) are those qualities that render a hostile state an easy victim to the central state and are thus enumerated :—"Not born of a royal family, greedy, surrounded by mean persons, having disloyal subjects, unrighteous, silly, addicted to evil passions, devoid of energy, trusting to fate, indiscreet, inconsistent, coward, and injurious" (Kauṭilya, Bk. VI, ch. I, pp. 256, 257.) Owing to these disabilities, a śatru can be easily made an instrument in the hands of the central sovereign. It is implied that the former is helped by the latter in the act of 'squeezing.'

II. Or a weak neighbouring state should be subdued ; and then with double power, a second, and with treble power, a third.¹

The processes involve a series of fights but as the time occupied by them is not in any way limited, there is no reason to suppose that they necessarily imply disregard of such inter-state practices as attacking states without preceding conflict, or friendly states in disregard of friendship. An aspiring king should abide the opportunities offered by disputes with other states but should not artificially stir them up to create the oppor-

¹ The first three mārgas (lit. ways) are but links of a single process, one leading to the other. The fourth mārga may be taken either as a link supplementary to the third (in which case, it cannot be called, strictly speaking, the fourth mārga) or as an independent second process standing apart from the first process composed of three links. The words "dviguṇaḥ" and "triguṇa", unless they be taken as used loosely, favour the interpretation of the fourth mārga as an independent second process of conquering the world.

The independent existence of friendly states was not perhaps regarded as a bar to world-conquest, if the central state could subjugate the hostile ones and thereby extend his dominion over a large expanse of territory, say from sea to sea.

tunities. It cannot be asserted that no breaches of salutary practices conducive to inter-state peace occurred in ancient times. An unruly, aggressive sovereign might have set them at naught but not without incurring the displeasure of the other states or even of his own subjects.¹ Whether this displeasure could take shape in steps to bring to justice the infraction of the practices is another question. The displeasure indicates the volume of opinion for the maintenance of the practices and can well be a reason for considering them as the prevailing ones.

○ The legitimate inference, therefore, stands out to be that an aspiring sovereign should accumulate as much power as possible by a due application of the śāstric injunctions to his personal conduct as well as to his administration of the realm. The increase of vigour of the resource-elements of the state should always be followed up by the pursuit of those

¹ See the Kauṭīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 13, p. 300 where reference is made to the displeasure incurred by attacks on sovereigns righteous, or friendly.

measures that remove the obstructions retarding their progress and make them stout and healthy. The steps suggested for the extension of territory and acquisition of power by conquests may lead one to infer that they imply treacherous attacks, without preceding conflict, on friendly states or on those in a miserable plight, but in the light of other evidences, there does not appear to be any ground for such supposition. The opportunities for war offered by the disputes that naturally came on were generally enough for the ambition of a royal aspirant able to utilize them fully. [Unjustified invasions of states merely to satisfy the earth-hunger of the invader were condemned by the opinion of the sovereigns generally as well as of the citizens.] When a king was powerful enough, he could assert and proclaim his power by performing the rājasūya or the aśvamedha ; but so long as he lacked this power, he had to wait for opportunities, making most of those that actually did present themselves. The advice of the writers of treatises on

polity is directed to this full utilization of opportunities, which is possible only by a previous accumulation of strength from careful and diligent internal administration of the realm and a regulation of inter-statal dealings in the light of their instructions and recommendations garnering the political wisdom of the past.

X The 'conquest of the earth' may be the goal cherished by the sovereigns but the difficulties besetting it are enormous. The lower the position of a monarch in the comity of states, the more onerous is his attempt to reach the goal. Favourable circumstances play not a mean part in the achievement of the object as also the capacity of the aspirant and his adherents. The task moreover cannot, except rarely, be accomplished by the labour of a single monarch in his life-time. The various usurpations of the throne of comparatively larger kingdoms extended into 'world-powers' by the usurpers may tend to obscure this view of the question ; but really the kingdoms acquired by the usurpers

were not fabrics of their creation but of their predecessors. Keeping these limitations in mind, we can well endorse the statement of the Kauṭīliya laudatory in a way of the injunctions of the works on polity.

“Ātmavāṁstvalpadeṣo’pi yuktaḥ prakṛiti-sampadā Nayajñāḥ pṛithivīm kṛitsnām jaya-tyeva na hīyate”.¹ [A self-controlled (king), with even a small territory, but versed in polity and possessed of the ‘state-elements’ in a flourishing condition, is sure to conquer the world and never decline in power.]

Kauṭīliya’s discourse on the courses of action is not meant for the central state alone but also for the other components of the maṇḍala; for, advice is needed as much for the state centrally situated as for those in different situations. Hence, two aspects of his advice are often noticeable: on the one hand, for instance, he states the circumstances in which to make a

The course of
action (shādi-
gūnyam.)

¹ Kauṭīliya, Bk. VI, ch. 2, p. 257.

treaty of peace with hostages while, on the other, he enumerates the means by which the hostages can escape from the territories to which they have been committed; similarly, he advises a powerful monarch as to when and whom to attack, recording as well the ways by which a weak or distressed monarch should defend himself against the attack; he offers his guidance in the same way to an invader by asking him to take proper precautions against a rear-attack, directing at the same time a rear-enemy as to when and whom to attack from behind. Thus his advice is meant for the solution of problems arising from different inter-statal situations and has in view the welfare not of a single state in a particular situation in the maṇḍala but of the other states in it as well.

An analysis of the ways by which difficulties in inter-statal situations could be tidied over laid bare to the Hindu statesmen six courses of action,—sandhi, vigraha, āsana, yāna, saṁśraya, and dvaidhībhāva. A fur-

ther analysis may reduce them to the first two, and according to Vāṭavyādhi, these two are taken as the fundamental courses ; but the aforesaid six are generally recognised in view of their applicability to different conditions.¹

These six courses of action admit of combinations and imply many other measures which need not be named at present. Let us treat of the first course first.

SECTION II.

Sandhi in the sense of treaty of peace represents but one of its uses in the Kauṭīliya. The other senses have to be carefully distinguished from the first in order to avoid a confusion. The term bears in the Kauṭīliya the following meanings :—

The different
senses of sandhi
in the Kauṭīliya.

(1) It is paṇabandha i.e. a treaty of peace²

¹ Kauṭīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 1, p. 261.

² *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. I, p. 261.

concluding hostilities between the parties to the treaty.

(2) It is a compact between powers in their efforts to have friendly state to help them in their needs.¹

(3) It is a compact between powers out on an expedition to divide among themselves the lands that might be acquired by each as the result of their combined efforts against a hostile state.²

(4) It is a compact to plant a colony.³

(5) It is a compact to carry out particular works advantageous to the parties to the compact, such as building forts, exploiting mines, constructing trade-routes.⁴

(6) It is a settlement of differences between the king and his friend or servant.⁵

It is the first signification alone that has to do with the treaty of peace. The use of

¹ See *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. 9 (mitra-sandhi).

² See *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. 10 (bhūmi-sandhi).

³ See *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. 11 (anavasita-sandhi).

⁴ See *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. 12 (karma-sandhi).

⁵ See *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. 6, pp. 279, 280.

the second kind of compact will be realized when it is borne in mind that to secure a friendly state for help in difficulties, specially in war, was not an easy matter ; for, as on the one hand, the combined request of two or more states was likely to be more mighty and persuasive than the request of single state, so on the other, the compact was helpful in the dissension that might have ensued from the rejection of the request.¹ The compact though termed a kind of sandhi was altogether different from the treaty of peace (hīna-sandhi), and might have been in certain cases dissociated from war. The third compact had connection with but preceded the conclusion of the war in which the parties acted as friends, while the fourth and fifth need not have anything to do with war at all. The sixth would be devoid of any direct inter-statal bearing if the mitra² instead of signifying a friendly sovereign

¹ Cf. such cases in *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. 7.

² In the passage “*bhṛityena mitrena vā doṣhāpasṛitena.....*” —*Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. 6, p. 279.

meant only a courtier or a personal friend of a particular king.

(A). It is the hīna-sandhis alone that constitute the treaty of peace for bringing the hostilities between the belligerents to a close. This is what we ordinarily mean by the term sandhi and will be dealt with at present, relegating the other kinds to subsequent sections.

The hīna-sandhis.

A treaty of peace should be concluded by a sovereign in view of the fact that the continuance of hostilities will make him gradually weaker than his enemy.¹ It is recommended to be made with states of superior or even equal power, for in the former case, the continuance of war is ruinous to the inferior state, and in the latter, to both. Should a superior power reject an offer of peace, the inferior has no other alternative but to throw itself up to the mercy of the former or have recourse to the methods of defence recom-

The circumstances in which sandhi should be made.

¹ Kauṭilya, Bk. VII, ch. 1, p. 261 —

“parasmāddhīyamāṇaḥ saṃdadhīta.”

mended in 'āvalīyasaṁ.'¹ If an offer of peace by a belligerent be rejected by another of equal strength, the former should wage war only so long as the latter sticks to it. An unqualified submission made by an inferior state ought to put a stop to hostilities, for ; as on the one hand, the state may grow in fury by further maltreatment, so on the other, it may be helped by the other powers of the statal circle taking pity on its miserable condition. Should a state allied with other states against an enemy find that the states of the adjacent zone² naturally hostile to it will not attack (nopagachchhanti) it, even if they are tempted, weakened, and oppressed by the enemy (trying to win them over to its side) or will not do so through fear of receiving blow for blow from the allied states (pratyādānabhayāt), then the state in alliance, even if inferior to the enemy indi-

¹ i.e., Bk. XII of the Kauṭīliya.

² Para-prakṛitayaḥ=ari-prakṛitayaḥ, the reference being to the rāja-prakṛitis and not to the citizens of the state of the enemy.

vidually, should continue the war. When again a state in war with another finds that the states of the adjacent zone will attack it, tempted, weakened, or oppressed by the latter, or through anxieties caused by the war waged next door, it should, even if individually superior to the enemy, make a treaty of peace in the first case, and remove the causes for anxiety to the aforesaid states in the second.¹ If a belligerent sees that he is afflicted with calamities greater than those of his enemy, who will be able to remedy them easily and carry on the war effectively, the former though superior in strength, should make peace with the latter.²

Kinds of Hina-
Sandhi.

The various kinds of treaty of
peace (hīna-sandhi)³ are :—

¹ The text (Kauṣīlya, Bk. VII, ch. 3, p. 267) has “mā nopagachchhanti” which appears to be an error for “ināmupagachchhanti.”

² For the texts of this paragraph, see Kauṣīlya Bk. VII, ch. 3, pp. 266, 267.

³ The treaty of peace is also called śama or samādhi. See Kauṣīlya, Bk. VII, ch. 17, p. 311.

I. (1) *Ātmāmisha*.¹ The defeated sovereign (henceforth abbreviated into DS) agrees to help the conqueror (henceforth abbreviated into C), by going over to him personally with a stipulated number or the flower of his troops. A person of high rank is also given as a hostage.

(2) *Purushāntra*. The DS agrees to help the C by sending the aforesaid troops headed by his son and commander-in-chief.² This exempts the personal attendance of the DS and hence its name. A woman is also given to the C as a hostage.³

¹ Corresponds to *Kāmandakīya*, sarga IX, ślk. 16.

² Corresponds to *Ibid.*, IX, 13.

³ The śloka in the *Kauṣīliya*, Bk. VII, ch. 3, p. 268 is as follows :—

“Mukhyastrībandhanam kuryātpūrvayoḥ paścimie tvarim, Sādhayedgūḍhamityete daṇḍopanata-sandhayaḥ.”

I have taken mukhya and strī separately in view of the fact that mukhyas are stated to have been given as hostages at *Kauṣīliya* Bk. VII, ch. 17, p. 312. “Arim gūḍham sādhayet” refers perhaps to the overreaching of the other party by the subsequent secret deliverance of hostages from the C's custody (see *Kauṣīliya*, Bk. VII, ch. 17, pp. 313, 314). If this meaning be accepted, “paścime” should be

(3) Adṛiṣṭapurusha. The DS agrees to help the C by sending the aforesaid troops headed either by himself or by somebody else. In the latter case, the personal attendance of himself, his son or his commander-in-chief is exempted.¹

The above three kinds of treaty form the class of sandhis called daṇḍopanata, daṇḍa (army) being the chief subject matter of their stipulations.

II. (1) Parikraya. The DS gives up his treasure to the C as the price of setting free the rest of the state-elements.²

(2) Skandhopaneya. The indemnity is paid in instalments.³

(3) Upagraha. By it, according to Kāmandaka, peace is purchased by the

taken in the sense of "subsequently" instead of as referring to the third treaty in spite of the juxtaposition which at first sight appears to exist between this word and "pūrvayoh."

¹ Corresponds to Kāmandakīya, IX, 14.

² Corresponds to *Ibid.* IX, 17.

³ Corresponds to *Ibid.* IX, 19 ('skandhaskandhena' means, according to Śaṅkarārya, 'khaṇḍakhaṇḍena').

surrender of the entire kingdom to the C.¹

(4) *Suvarṇa*. Its foundation lies in friendship and mutual confidence. Hence, it is called Golden.²

(5) *Kapāla*. This form of treaty is of a nature reverse to that of the Golden. Under this, a very large indemnity has to be paid to the C. According to the *Kāmandakīya*,³ the two parties to the treaty are of equal strength, and the peace concluded between them does not produce mutual confidence rendering it the reverse of the Golden.⁴

¹ Corresponds to *Kāmandakīya*, IX, 16. The *Kauṣīlīya* is not so clear on this point, but says nothing that contradicts the above definition.

² Corresponds to *Ibid.*, IX, 8.

³ *Ibid.*, IX, 5. Śaṅkarāya accounts for the name of the treaty by stating that as the two skull-bones (*kapāla*) of a man appearing similar to each other from a distance show points of dissimilarity when observed closely, so the two belligerents though agreeing so far as to be parties to the *sandhi* really differ from each other owing to the lurking suspicion of each for the other.

⁴ *Ibid.* IX, 15.

The five forms¹ of treaty constitute the class called *koṣopanata* i.e. having *koṣa* (treasure) as the chief subject-matter of their terms.

III. (1) *Ādishtā*. The DS cedes a part of his territory to the C.

(2) *Uchchhinna*. It requires the DS to cede to the C all the rich lands in his territory except his capital.² The C intends by this form of treaty to bring misery upon his enemy (*para*).

(3) *Apakraya*.³ The DS releases his dominion by giving up the products of his lands to the C.

(4) *Paribhūṣhaṇa*.⁴ The DS has to pay more than his own lands produce.

¹ Kauṣīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 3, p. 269, last sloka.

² 'Ātta-sārāṇaṃ' in the text (Kauṣīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 3, p. 269), if taken to signify 'denuded of resources,' renders the meaning of the passage opposite to that given above. 'Ātta' may mean 'seized' and 'āttasārāṇaṃ from āttaḥ sārāḥ yayā tāsām' may be interpreted as 'possessed of resources.' This meaning is in accord with that of the Kāmandakiya, IX, 18.

³ Pandit R. Śyāma Śāstri's English rendering of the text puts the term as *avakraya*.

⁴ The Kāmandakiya of Trivendrum Sanskrit Series has *paraḍūṣhaṇa* in the place of *paribhūṣhaṇa*.

These four forms of treaty are termed deṣopanata, the cession of territory (deṣa) being their special feature.

Kauṭilya mentions in all twelve kinds of hīna-sandhis of which three belong to the first class, five to the second, and four to the third. Barring slight differences of meaning and taking into account the similarity of names of the treaties, all the hīna-sandhis of the Kauṭīliya are found in the Kāmandakīya with the exception of avakraya alone. As the latter has sixteen altogether, these five viz. upahāra, santāna, upanyāsa, pratikāra and saṁyoga have no equivalents in the former. Of these, the last two appear rather to be alliances and not forms of treaty of peace at all, pratikāra corresponding with alliances like the bhūmi-sandhi, and saṁyoga with alliances like the karma-sandhi of the Kauṭīliya.

Treaties of peace depending for their strength upon the solemn affirmation or oath of the parties were looked upon by some

Solemn affirmation or oath in treaties of peace.
Hostages.

as mutable, but when accompanied by pratibhū¹ or pratigraha,² as immutable. ~~X~~ Kautilya is of opinion that the solemn affirmation or oath made the treaties as much immutable as could be done by any safeguards simultaneously for the purposes of this and the next world. The taking of hostages only added to their strength on their worldly side.³

~~X~~ In making a *solemn affirmation*, the parties only uttered the words "saṁhitāssmaḥ" (we are united), while they took *oaths* by fire, water, plough, wall (say, of a fort), clod of earth, shoulder of an elephant, horse-back, seat of a chariot, weapon, precious stone, seed of plant, fragrant substance, rasa,⁴ gold coin, or bullion, saying this formula on the occasion, "let it or these (naming the thing

¹ Pratibhū means the giving of great ascetics or nobles as hostages (Kauṭilya, Bk. VII, ch. 17, p. 312).

² In pratigraha, the hostage given by the party suing for peace is a near blood-relation. (*Ibid.*).

³ Kauṭilya, Bk. VII, ch. 17, p. 311.

⁴ As it signifies a variety of substances, mercury, poison, milk &c., it is not clear which of them is meant.

or things by which the oath is administered) desert and kill me if I transgress the oath."¹

The kings of yore who put so much faith in affirmations used to enter into treaties of peace with the simple formula "we are united." In case of breach of this affirmation, they took the oath ; and when this oath was contravened, the hostages were demanded.

Much discrimination had to be used by both the parties in the selection of the hostage, for a good deal depended upon the place occupied by him in the love or religious susceptibilities of the giver or his subjects. It was the interest of the giver to make over the person for whom he cared least or who would prove troublous or ruinous to the taker, while the latter tried to have one to whom an injury conditioned by a breach of the treaty, would affect the tenderest sentiments of the former or his people.

Discrimination
in the selection
of the hostage.

¹ *Ibid.*, Bk. VII, ch. 17, p. 312.

Keeping these points in view, Kauṭilya dilates on the subject, which may be summarized as follows:—Advantageous to the giver are the undermentioned hostages: (1) a great ascetic or noble, able to trouble or ruin the foe; (2) a corrupt son; (3) a daughter; (4) a baseborn son; (5) a son devoid of mantra-śakti (who does not follow, or has not at his disposal wise advisers); (6) a son devoid of utsāha-śakti¹ (i.e., capacity for the three kinds of hostilities); (7) a son unskilful in the use of weapons² and (8) one of many sons. A king parting with his only son as hostage is unable, as a

¹ Kauṭilya explains 'utsāha-śakti' by 'vikrama-bala' and 'vikrama' by prakāśa-yuddha, kṛṣa-yuddha and tūshṇīm-yuddha. (Kauṭilya, Bk. VII, ch. 2, p. 259; and ch. 6, p. 278).

² Kauṭilya distinguishes the relative superiority or inferiority of sons by virtue of their nobility of extraction (on the mother's side), wisdom (from mantra-śakti), bravery (from utsāha-śakti), skilfulness in the use of weapons, and such other qualities. The last passage at p. 312 appears to be corrupt, and the significance of the expression 'lupta-dāyāda-santānatvāt' as also its consistency with the last passage, as it stands, are not evident. [See Kauṭilya, Bk. VII, ch. 17, pp. 312, 313].

rule, to risk a breach of the treaty. Should there be no chance of a second son being born to him, he should rather give himself up as hostage, installing his son on the throne.¹

In ancient inter-state relations, it was the power possessed by a state that determined, to a great extent, its conduct towards the other states.

A sovereign submitting to a humiliating treaty of peace might have, sometime after the exhaustion of the war, recouped his power so much as to be superior to the other sovereign to whom he was bound by the treaty under which he was smarting. In such a case, the contrivance resorted to was to secure the escape of the hostage from the custody of the other party. The matter was so managed that outwardly the hostage appeared to escape of his own free will² and without any help from his

The breach of the treaty, whether justified.

¹ Kauṭilya, Bk. VII, ch. 17, pp. 312, 313.

² Although I have spoken of the hostage as masculine, the above remarks might also apply to female hostages.

pledger, although secret agents in the pay of the latter might actually assist in the matter. The escape of the hostage unsettled the existing treaty, and gave rise to conditions in which the fresh demands of the pledgee might be either rejected point blank or refused on various grounds. This would lead to friction but as the circumstances are changed in as much as the aggrieved party has become inferior in power to the other,¹ he is not likely to declare a war specially as there is no direct proof of the pledger's assistance in the escape of the hostage. The act is, in view of the latter's secret implication in it, really wrongful but concealed under a garb of innocence, and turned to advantage by a shuffling of what to an inferior state would have been brought home as its duty. The only argument that might be adduced in favour of the breach of treaty is with reference to the exceptional cases in which, for instance, the very exist-

¹ The text has "abhyuchchīyamāṇaḥ samādhi-mokṣhaṃ kārayet" (Kauṣīlyā, Bk. VII, ch. 17, p. 313).

ence or the necessary development of the state bound by the treaty are hampered by its terms. The ground for the breach would then be this that the latter are the primary duties of the state and any obligations that hinder their fulfilment must be considered null and void.¹

The hostage in effecting his escape took to various dodges and utilized the help provided by secret agents. The dodges were not always of a mild type but included, if needed, violent means that made light losses of human life for achieving the end in view. A study of the Kautīliya leads to the inference that sacrifices of human lives caused through secret agents for state-ends in inter-statal discords, in measures against sedition within the state or against enmity personally to the king and his own were not generally regarded as obstacles at which the state would stick, the interests of the

The dodges for
the deliverance
of the hostage

¹ Cf. Dr. L. Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. I, p. 550.

kingdom and the monarch and their self-preservation being regarded as justifying the application of the means. The artifices used by and for the hostage for his deliverance were :—

(1) Spies (satriṇaḥ) serving in the neighbourhood in the guise of artisans and craftsmen may remove the hostage surreptitiously through a tunnel constructed at night.

(2) Spies disguised as actors, dancers, singers, players of musical instruments, buffoons, bards, acrobats, jugglers &c., may take service under the enemy and secure for themselves the privilege of free ingress, stay, or egress. They will also serve the hostage who may escape at night in the guise of one of these people. Women spies may also do the same and the hostage dressed like one of them with a characteristic article in hand may effect his escape.

(3) The hostage may be concealed amidst commodities, clothes, vessels, boxes, beds, seats, and articles of luxury, and removed

by spies serving the enemy as *sūdas*¹ (those who cook pulses or vegetables), *ārālikas*² (those who boil rice), bathers, shampooers, spreaders of bed-clothes, barbers (*kalpaka*), toilet-makers, or drawers of water.

This reminds one of the memorable artifice by which Sivaji made his escape from Aurangzeb's custody.

(4) The hostage may hold communion with Varuṇa at the entrance of a tunnel, or in a reservoir of water, accompanied with nocturnal *upahāra*, (oblations, or religious services consisting of laughter, song, dance,

¹ *Sūda*, according to the *Vāchaspatya*, is the same as *Sūpakartā*. *Nīlakaṇṭha* in his comments on the *MBh.*, *Virāṭa-Parva*, ch. 2, ślk. 9 states that a *sūpakāra* is one who cooks pulses like *mudga* (*phaseolus mungo*). According to others quoted by him, *sūpakartā* may also be one who cooks vegetables.

As explained by the scholiast in connection with the above passage, an *ārālika* may mean (1) one who plays with or disciplines an infuriated elephant; or (2) one who boils rice. (This passage "*ārāliko'nnapāki syāt, sūpakartā tu śākakṛit*" is quoted as his authority).

² These spies are named at p. 21 of the *Kauṭīliya*, Bk. I (*gudhapurusha-prañidhiḥ*).

muttering huḍuk, adoration and pious ejaculations),¹ and flee away at the opportune moment.² Spies in the guise of traders divert the attention of the sentinels by selling them fruits and cooked food.

(5) The hostage may give the sentinels food and drink mixed with poisonous preparation of madana plant³ on the occasions of offerings to the gods, ṣrāḍha, or sacrificial rites,⁴ and when the sentinels are under its influence, he may flee away.

(6) The sentinels may be incited to set fire to buildings with valuable articles, or spies disguised as citizens, bards, physicians,

¹ Monier Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary under Upahāra.

² Cf. Kauṭīliya, Bk. XIII, ch. 1, p. 393. The expression 'varuṇa-yoga' bears the implication that it is a trick by which the enemy is over-reached.

³ For madana-yoga, see Kauṭīliya, Bk. XIV, ch. 1, p. 410.

⁴ The Sanskrit word is "pravahana" which seems to be mistakenly put for "prahavaṇa." Paṇḍit R. Śyāma Śāstri translates it by "sacrificial rites" implying that the word should be "prahavaṇa." There seem to be other instances of confusion between the two words in the Kauṭīliya, e.g., at p. 401 (Bk. XIII, ch. 3).

or vendors of cakes may do the same. The sentinels may be persuaded to set on flames the stores of commercial articles, or spies disguised as traders may do so. In the tumult the hostage may escape. To avert the chance of being pursued, the house occupied by the hostage may be set on fire and a dead body (procured previously) may be cast into the flames. The hostage may escape by making a breach in the wall, or through an air-passage (*vāta-suruṅgā*).

(7) The hostage may escape at night in the disguise of a carrier of glasswares, pitchers, or other commodities.

(8) He may enter the hermitages of the Shavelings (*muṇḍas*) and the Braided-haired (*jaṭīlas*)¹ and escape thence in the guise of one of these hermits.

He may also disguise himself as one suffering from a deforming disease, as a forester, or the like, and flee away.

(9) He may be removed as a corpse by

¹ For these classes of hermits, see Dr. Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India*, p. 145.

spies, or may himself follow as a widowed wife a corpse carried by the spies as if to the crematorium.

(10) He may at nightfall upon the sentinels with a concealed sword and run away with the secret agents stationed in the neighbourhood.

Spies in the apparel of foresters would misdirect the pursuers. The hostage may conceal himself under the enclosure of a cart driven along the way. The pursuers being near, he may hide himself in a bush. When there is no bush at hand, he may leave on both sides of the way gold coins or poisoned articles of food for the pursuers. If captured, he will apply to the captors conciliation and other means (bribery, dissension, and chastisement), or serve them with poisoned food. In case, a corpse supposed to be that of the hostage had been put in as a dodge at the place where the aforesaid worship of Varuṇa was held, or at the house (set on fire) where the hostage stayed, the giver of the hostage may

accuse of murder the sovereign who held him.¹

(B). Of the several kinds of treaty of peace, the first three have been found to form a group called Daṇḍo-panata-Sandhis, daṇḍa (army) being the chief subject-matter of their stipulations. The daṇḍopanata of the Kauṭīliya, Bk. VII, chs. 15, 16 appears to be a much more helpless sovereign than one who is compelled to sue for a treaty of peace in any of the above three forms. When the disparity in power between a sovereign and his invader be very great and the former sees no other means of saving himself except by throwing himself upon the latter's mercy, he becomes daṇḍopanata. This self-submitter owes several obligations to the daṇḍopanāyin (henceforth to be termed 'dominator'). These obligations do not appear to be part and parcel of the three daṇḍopanata treaties of peace, which points to the inference that

¹ For the above information about the dodges, see Kauṭīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 17. pp. 313-315.

the position of a self-submitter is not the outcome of those treaties but is rather caused by self-submission before any fight takes place between him and the invader who afterwards becomes the dominator.

For one who had enjoyed independence, the position of a self-submitter was no doubt humiliating. He had to demean himself towards his dominator rather like a government servant in the conventional ways, discharging his duties faithfully, but adapting himself to the moods of his master to continue in the latter's good graces.¹ He had to, when ordered by the dominator or with his permission, engage in the construction of forts or other works, invite (other kings), celebrate marriages, hold the installation ceremonies of a son, capture elephants for sale, perform sacrifices, march against foes, or start on

¹ "Labdhasaṃśrayaḥ samayāchārivadbhartari varteta" Kauṭilya, Bk. VII, ch. 15, p. 303 [referrug to *Ibid.*, Bk. V, ch. 5 (samayāchārikaṃ), p. 250.]

excursions for amusement.¹ He could not enter into alliance with any kings² staying in his kingdom or secretly punish those who had backed out from such alliances.³ If the citizens in his kingdom be wicked, he could not exchange it for lands with righteous people from another king, punish the wicked with secret punishments, or accept lands offered by a friendly king, without the aforesaid permission. Interview with the chief councillor, royal priest, commander-in-chief, or heir-apparent without the knowledge of

¹ Some of the items enumerated above may be on behalf of the dominator. The construction of forts, for instance, may be for the defence of the dominator's kingdom, while several of the remaining items may be intended for him as well.

² The word in the text is *prakṛiti*. The reference is to *rāja-prakṛiti*. For a parallel use of the word, see the heading "*prakṛitinām sāmavāyikaviparimarśaḥ*" in which "*prakṛitinām*" means *rāja-prakṛitinām*" (*Kauṣiṭhīya*, Bk. VII, ch. 5, p. 272).

³ For the treatment of the *apasṛitas*, see *Kauṣiṭhīya*, Bk. VIII, ch. 6, pp. 278-280 where *apaśīrṇa-kriyā* has been dealt with.

the dominator was prohibited.¹ It was incumbent on the self-submitter to help the dominator to the utmost of his capacity and always express his readiness to do so. On the occasions of invocations of blessings on the dominator before the gods, he should promptly cause the ceremony to be observed in his territory. He had to dissociate himself from people hostile to the dominator² and

¹ There has been an omission of a negative particle in the Sanskrit passage for this sentence. Kauṣīlya, Bk. VII, ch. 15, p. 308).

² For the above information regarding self-submitter, see Kauṣīlya, Bk. VII, ch. 15, p. 308.

The śloka at p. 308 of the Kauṣīlya, Bk. VII, ch. 15 is—
 Saṃyukta-balavatsevī viruddha-śaṅkitādibhiḥ,
 Varteta daṇḍopanato bhartaryevamavasthitaḥ.

The self-submitter should be united with (saṃyukta) those who fear to mix with people opposed to the dominator (viruddha-śaṅkitādibhiḥ). Mallinātha quotes this passage from the Kauṣīlya in connection with his comments on Raghuvamśa, sarga 17, ślk. 81. The passage quoted by him shows some variations but the meaning remains unaltered :

Durbalo balavatsevī viruddhāchchhaṅkitādibhiḥ,
 Varteta daṇḍopananto bhartaryevamavasthitaḥ.

hold his territory virtually as the latter's "warehouse."¹

It seems from the above evidences that the self-submitter was allowed to live in his own territory but had to go over, when needed, to that of the dominator or elsewhere and stay there so long as the work in hand or the dominator's desire compelled his stay. It is to such stay that the advice embodied in the Kauṭīliya² applies. The advice is that when he saw the dominator suffering from a fatal disease, or his (dominator's) kingdom from internal troubles, when the latter's enemies were growing (in number or prosperity) or his allies unwilling or unable

¹ The king, who has no other alternative than self-submission, is asked by the Kauṭīliya (Bk.VII, ch.15, p. 308) to greet the envoy of the invader thus:—"This (*i e.*, this kingdom) is the king's (using of course appropriate expressions such as "His Majesty's") warehouse; it belongs to the queen and the princes (using appropriate epithets as before); the existence of this kingdom depends upon the words of the queen and the princes; I am but their reflector."

² Kauṭīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 2, p. 265.

to support him, creating thereby opportunities for the self-submitter to ameliorate his condition, then he (self-submitter) might, under some believable (sambhāvya) pretence of a disease or performance of some religious rites, leave the dominator's kingdom. If already in his own state, he might not, in view of the aforesaid opportunities, come to the dominator suffering as above ; or coming nearer, he might strike at the vulnerable points¹ of the dominator's state.²

Just as the self-submitter owed a number of obligations to the dominator, so also did the latter to the former.

The dominator's obligations to the devoted submitter were :—

- (1) To help him to the best of his (dominator's) power in return for help received ;
- (2) To give him wealth and honour ;
- (3) To help him in calamities ;

¹ The word in the text is "chhidra." Śaṅkarārya, in connection with Kāmandakīya, VIII, 65, interprets this term by "rakshā-śaithilya."

² Kauṭīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 2, p. 265.

(4) To grant him interviews whenever asked, and accede to his requests ;

(5) To avoid using insulting, offensive, contemptuous, and harshly loud language towards him ;

(6) To show him fatherly kindness, and ask him to feel secure from fear ;

(7) Not to lay claim to lands or moveable properties of the submitter deceased or put to death, or injure his wife and children ; to allow his distant relations to enjoy their belongings, and his son to succeed to his father's office after the latter's death.

It is only such treatment as above that can ensure the devotion of the submitter and his heirs to the dominator and his heirs through generations. Humane treatment of the submitter was required by the opinion not merely of the sovereigns of the time but also of the people. A warning in the Kauti-
liya, for this reason, cautions the dominator against transgression, specially of the last obligation which happens to be the most important. Breach of this obligation, says

the Kauṭīliya, agitates the whole statal circle to actions for the destruction of the dominator, and even his own ministers living within his dominion to attempt his life or deprive him of his kingdom.

A recalcitrant submitter however lost claim to the above treatment. He could be punished by the dominator secretly or openly, his guilt being made public in the latter case. If the open punishment put the dominator to the risk of rousing his enemies and of giving them a handle wherewith to work against him, he should have recourse to the secret means dwelt on in the Kauṭīliya in its chapter Dāṇḍakarmikam.¹

¹ Kauṭīliya, Bk. V, ch. 1.

Kauṭīliya, Bk. VII, ch. 16 (pp. 309-311), headed Daṇḍo-panāyivṛttam, begins rather obscurely with directions to the self-submitter ordered by the dominator to start on a military expedition, as well as with advice as to the use of the four means of conciliation (sāma), bribery (dāna), dissension (bheda), and open assault (daṇḍa). A classification of the self-submitters comes in next, the basis of classification being the nature of help given by him to the dominator.

The classes are thus named : (1) chitra-bhoga
(2) mahābhoga

(C). The alliances are of various kinds,
 some being made with the ob-
 ject of deriving greater strength
 to be used against an invading enemy,

Alliances.

(3) sarvabhoga

(5) ubhayatobhogin, and

(4) ekatobhogin

(6) sarvatobhogin.

In the first three classes, the help rendered by the self-submitter consists in giving the dominator men and wealth, while in the last three, it accrues from the self-submitter remedying the evil arising to the dominator from his enemies or from the friends of those enemies. The passage bearing on ubhayatobhogin (p. 310) is corrupt; for unlike the preceding and succeeding sentences relating to ekatobhogin and sarvatobhogin respectively, it has the verb "upakaroti" instead of "pratikaroti."

The paragraph at p. 310, immediately following the above passages, is also intended for the guidance of the self-submitter. Should he have to encounter a rear enemy, or other hostile parties conciliable by gifts of lands during the aforesaid military expedition carried on under the orders of the dominator, the lands given them for the purpose should be such as might put them to trouble or offer them minimum of military or other advantages of which they might be in need. The paragraph has also in view cases in which gifts of lands are to be made to parties like "apavāhita," and "gatapratyāgata." The gift of land to the dominator (bhartṛi) alone is advised to be of advantage to the dominator in as much as the land should be free from people inimical to him.

and the rest with the object of material gain that may or may not have any reference to war.

There may be circumstances in which a weak and a powerful state may happen to have such differences as cannot be settled amicably, and recourse is had to war. The former to defend itself against the inroads of its powerful adversary may resort to various means of protection, of which those coming under sandhi or having some touch with sandhi are sambhūya-prayāṇa (allied attack), saṁśraya (resignation to the protection of a powerful state), and dvaidhī-bhāva (dual courses of action).

In allied attack, the allies can expect returns of various kinds for their exertions *viz.*, specific shares of the gains, shares in proportion to the men and money supplied, and so forth.¹ This sort of arrangement may lead one to infer at first sight that the shares fixed between any two allies limit

¹ Kauṭīliya, p. 274 (2nd ed.).

their respective gains to the mere money-values of those shares; but actually this is not so in many cases. There are aspects of the question under which gains apparently equal and considered as such by a less intelligent ally would really be found unequal, the gain being in favour of the more intelligent of the parties to the alliance, who had by his clearer vision foreseen the various advantages of the work or position cleverly chosen or caused to be allotted to him, unknown to the other allies.¹ To guard against these pitfalls, Kauṭilya details the various considerations, accompanied with concrete instances, under which greater gains may come to the more clever of the parties at the cost of the rest. It will be found that the party gaining more has to have at his disposal detailed information regarding men and things of the surrounding countries. He had to be well-informed

¹ Kauṭilya indicates two degrees of difference of gain by expressions *vishama-sandhi* and *ati-sandhi*. In the latter, the difference is very great.

as to the personality of the neighbouring sovereigns, nature of the people within their respective dominions, kinds of wealth owned in superfluity by each, and above all, the economic topography of the various regions.

(1) *Mitra-sandhi*. A sovereign S, who wishes to make an allied attack, (*samhita-prayāṇa*), requests another sovereign S' to join him, and in order to strengthen their side, may agree among themselves to persuade other powers to participate in their mission, of course, in expectation of adequate returns for their risk and trouble. In this work of bringing over powers to their side, S and S' may each make efforts separately for the purpose. It is here that the question of collateral gains arises; for the close contact of either S or S' with the particular power persuaded to join him as also the common cause for which they co-operate, together with the common enmities created by the ensuing dissension and fight with the common enemy with his allies, if any, served to make firmer and continue, long

after the coming fight, the friendly relation between S or S' and the power or powers brought over through his influence and persuasion to help him in the achievement of his object. Further, the power thus persuaded may happen to be in need of help pecuniary or otherwise at the time he is called to join the combination and this help rendered him in his need cements the friendship a good deal. When S and S' select between themselves, the direction in which each should go and marks out between themselves the sovereigns with whom each would negotiate, the more keen-sighted of them can secure future advantages for himself by the choice he makes unperceived by the other. The appended chart contains the important points to which the parties to mitra-sandhi should turn their attention. The differences of opinion between Kautilya and earlier authorities on polity would show the subtleties involved in the questions and the difficulties of arriving at conclusions without a previous grounding in those matters.

Alternative nature of the contemplated allies.	Āchāryas prefer	Āchāryā's grounds for preference.	Kauṭilya prefers	Kauṭilya's grounds for preference.
(a) Nitya but a-vaśya.	(b) Anitya but vaśya.	(a)	(b)	Helpfulness being the criterion of an ally, one of the second kind is preferable.
(a) Anitya but mahā-bhoga.	(b) Nitya but alpa-bhoga.	(a)	(b)	(b) with smaller resources and helping by smaller instalments stands steadfast, while (a) either recedes from giving help shortly after alliance or tries to get return for help when rendered.
(a) Guru-samuttha but mahat.	(b) Laghu-samuttha though alpa.	(a)	(b)	(b) ready at call joins at the right moment and usable at will, being weaker.

(a) A power possessing militia with its units scatteredly engaged in non-military occupations.	(b) A power with an uncompliant army.	(a)	Because the scattered units being compliant can be collected easily.	(b)	Because uncompliance can be remedied by conciliation, etc., but scattered units engaged in their own pursuits cannot be collected timely.
(a) A power with large army (puru-sha-bhoga).	(b) A power with large treasure.	(a)	Because large army gives great military strength	(b)	Treasure is more frequently brought into use than army, and is the means of having an army and fulfilling desires.
(a) A power with large treasure.	(b) A power with extensive lands.	(a)	Because treasure can meet all demands.	(b)	Lands can procure both ally and treasure.

Between two powers with armies numerically equal, the determinants for choice are their prowess, power of endurance, allegiance to the sovereign, and the inclusion of all classes of fighters (such as maula, bhṛita, śreṇī, etc.),¹ while between two powers with equal treasures, they are readiness to accede to requests, munificence, lesser energy, and inconstancy. References are made to qualities other than those already mentioned such as pitṛipaitāmaha, advaidha, ubhaya-bhāvi, śatru-sādhārana etc., but as it is impossible to exhaust all the characteristics of allies in all the possible situations that may crop up, the groups of alternatives already cited are sufficiently illustrative of the lines on which choice should be made.²

(2) Bhūmi-sandhi. This alliance differs from the former in regard to the main, immediate objective of the parties to the

¹ See Kauṭilya p. 288.

² For the information on Mitra-sandhi, see Kauṭilya, pp. 289-292.

alliance *viz.*, acquisition of lands, while in the former it was acquisition of ally. Both the alliances are connected with allied attack, of which these may be considered as offshoots. The differences in gain in the present alliance arise, as in *mitra-sandhi*, from the choice of respective directions in which the parties march and ultimately happen to wrest lands from the defeated foe. If it is agreed that the lands conquered by each would be his, this choice of directions becomes all the more important. If, again, the division of lands acquired by the parties at first form a common stock to be divided among them after the conclusion of the fight, the allotment of the divisions has to be scrutinized in the light of facts pointed out by Kautilya; for, otherwise, lands with advantages unperceived by one but perceived by another may be apportioned, without a demur, to a share causing difference of gain in substance though not so in appearance. Kautilya's recommendations are meant to open the eyes of the parties in order

that in the two sorts of agreements for division of lands mentioned above, they should have regard to facts several of which are indicated by him. These may be classified as in the appended chart :

Alternative kinds of lands.	Kautilya prefers	Kautilya's grounds for preference.
(a) Lands sampanna but nityāmitra.	(b)	Because the impermanent enemy in the case of (b) can be conciliated, while a permanent enemy ¹ in the case of (a) cannot be so treated. [Āchāryyas differ from Kautilya preferring (a), because sampanna lands can procure treasure and army, which can keep in check the contiguous enemy.]
(b) Lands mandagūṇa (sterile) but anityāmitra.	(a)	
(a) Lands extensive but near at hand.	(a)	
(a) Lands distant but self-protecting.	(a)	Because in the case of (a), military help and treasure are within the reach of the territory in need of defence.
(a) Lands acquired from a foolish enemy.	(a)	The subjects of the latter attached to the sovereign cause trouble.

¹ 'Land with nityāmitra (permanent enemy)' means one contiguous to another containing many forts and permanently peopled either with marauding tribes or barbarous foresters. Kautilya, p. 293.

Continued from p. 79.

Alternative kinds of lands.	Kautilya prefers	Kautilya's grounds of preference.
<p>(a) Lands from a sovereign intended to be 'squeezed' (pīḍanīya)¹</p> <p>Three kinds pīḍanīya are distinguished :—</p> <p>(i) with sthala-durga (land-fort) ;</p> <p>(ii) with nadī-durga (river-fort) ;</p> <p>(iii) with parvata-durga (hill-fort).</p>	(b)	<p>Because the latter wishing to flee away with his treasures and army is forsaken by his subjects, while the former is only hindered from enjoying the full use of his forts and allies.</p> <p>Lands from a sovereign in a land-fort are preferable to those from one in a river-fort, which again are preferable to those from one in a hill-fort ; for, it will be seen, that the three kinds of forts have been mentioned in order of increasing difficulties in reducing them.</p>

The next two groups of alternatives relate to lands from sovereigns with certain kinds of army accustomed to fighting in certain ways.

(a) Lands from a chala, adjacent to a powerful state.	(b) Lands from a chala, adjacent to a weak state.	(b) Because a sovereign acquiring lands with weak adjacent states thrives quickly; for powerful adjacent states bring about diminution of treasure and military strength.
(a) Lands from an amitra, adjacent to a powerful state.	(b) Lands from an amitra, adjacent to a weak state.	Same reason as above.

¹ *Prīdana* (squeezing) is, according to the *Kāmandakiya* (sarga 8, ślk. 61) and the scholium of *Śaṅkarārya* on same, more severe than *karṣaṇa* which means the gradual lessening of treasure and army, and slaying of principal officials. *Śaṅkarārya* adds that '*prīdana*' is *māla-varja-deśa-vilopana*' signifying perhaps 'commission of ravages within a territory outside its capital.'

² *Uchchedana*, (eradication) means the ejection of a sovereign who is either devoid of or weak in *durga* (fort) and *mitra* (ally), the two among seven sources of strength of a state.

Kauṭilya further points out three cases in which excessive gain may come to one, as against much smaller gain to the other party to the alliance :

(a) When the party acquires lands teeming with valuable products.

(b) The acquisition of lands described in (a) being made by two parties, the one, who acquires the lands after defeating a powerful sovereign, gains in excess ; for not only does he get lands but also superior strength. Lands acquired from a small power are necessarily smaller in extent and value while, at the same time, the neighbour who was friendly turns hostile.

(c) If two parties acquire lands by defeating two powerful sovereigns, the one who does so by ousting the enemy from a fort (situated within the lands acquired) gains in excess.¹

(3) Karma-sandhi. This kind of alliance, as already stated, is unlike the first

¹ The expression 'mitrāṭavi' should evidently be 'amitrā-ṭavi.' Kauṭilya, p. 293. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 304, line 7.

two in as much as the immediate object in view is not necessarily an impending fight but the advancement of the state in wealth and military strength, which may in near future help the parties the more in their struggles with their enemies. The kinds of work in which the co-operation of two or more kings is arranged for among themselves are, as instanced by Kauṭilya, (a) construction of forts and (b) irrigation works, (c) clearance of forests yielding raw materials of various sorts, ¹(d) conversion of forest into one with elephants or wild beasts to serve political ends, (e) utilization of forest tribes (brought into touch at the time of clearance of forests) for military purposes, (f) exploitation of mines, and (g) construction or rehabilitation of land and water routes for commercial purposes. The co-operation among the kings may be of various shapes in which one or another may bear a share of the outlay, help in the supply of labour and raw materials, or take upon himself

¹ See Kauṭilya, pp. 99 ff. (Kupyādhyakshaḥ).

more onerous portions of the undertakings. The profits or advantages to be apportioned to one of them would naturally be proportioned to the share of his burden in the works, and the question of *atisandhi* i.e., in this case, disproportionate gain, arises when one of the parties binds himself to take a fixed return in money or kind, which, supposed adequate at the outset, proves too small in comparison with the gains acquired by the other party or parties at the conclusion of the works.

(4) *Anavasita-sandhi*.¹ This alliance for planting a colony in unpeopled lands is like the previous *sandhi* remote from an immediate object of waging war. The acquisition of wealth and expansion of dominion constitute its immediate objects. In the first portion of the chapter on this subject,

¹ The expression means 'alliance for planting a colony.'
[Derivation : *vas*+*kta*=*usita*, or *vasita* (see Monier Williams' *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*) ; *na*+*vasita*=*avasita* (uninhabited) ; *na*+*avasita*=*anavasita*, i. e., uninhabited (lands) converted into a colony.]

Kauṭilya gives directions to the sovereigns intending to send settlers to the intended colony, as to which kinds of lands should be chosen for the purpose as against others which should not be selected for definite reasons (see the following chart). The second portion of the chapter offers advice to those sovereigns to whom the lands belong, but who are required to sell them to the aforesaid sovereigns bent on settling colonies thereon.

Kinds of lands.	Which preferable	Grounds of preference.
(a) A large piece of dry land. [A piece of dry-land yielding prior and subsequent crops matured by lesser rain-fall and where unintercepted labour is possible should be preferred.]	(b) A small piece of watery land. [A piece of watery land yielding paddy should be preferred to one of equal area yielding other crops. If the latter be larger, this should be preferred.]	Because conducive to a continuous yield all the year.
(a) Lands containing mines.	(b) Lands yielding paddy.	For bullion can fetch all other possessions.
(a) Lands with timber-forest.	(b) Lands with elephant-forest.	Because elephant-forests are not easily available; and the elephants are the principal source of military strength. The Āchāryas, however, hold the opposite view.
(a) Lands with water-ways.	(b) Lands with land-routes.	Because the water-ways are impervious.

(a) Lands with people not combined into srenis.	(b) Lands with people combined into srenis.	(a) Because the people in (a) are tractable and not alienable while those in (b) are of reverse nature, unable to bear encroachments on their rights and privileges, and lead to great evil when displeased.
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In a colony containing settlers belonging to all the four castes, the one in which the majority of inhabitants are of the lower castes is preferable in view of their numbers and constancy.

(a) Lands not yet cultivated.	(b) Cultivated lands.	Because (a) may acquire importance by affording sustenance to cattle, attracting rich merchants, and by being a commercial centre with rich merchants to whom loans and remissions are granted. ¹
(a) Lands with forts containing military men but with little civil population. ²	(b) Lands with a greater proportion of civil population.	Because the main stay of prosperity of a kingdom is its civil population.

¹ The Sanskrit text is faulty.

² In passages like this, Kautilya evidently speaks of lands which have turned out to be of the description given in these columns as the results of colonisation.

Kauṭilya's advice is next directed to the cases in which the act of colonisation involves a good deal of waste and expenditure, and the lands are alienated by one sovereign to another who takes them for colonisation and is expected to bear the aforesaid waste and expenditure, but, for certain reasons, is suspected to be wanting in the adequate capacity to bear them. The classes of purchasers who come under this suspicion are :—(1) weak and not of royal descent, (2) un-enterprising, (3) without followers or helpers, (4) unrighteous, (5) subject to one or more of the calamities and addicted to one or other of the vices (described in the Kauṭilya, Bk. VII, on vyasanas), (6) fatalistic, (7) arbitrary in actions.¹ In dealings with these parties, the seller is advised to part with his lands sub-

¹ Details about each of these classes are given in the Kauṭilya which need not be recounted here for our purpose.

ject to a condition that they will be his, if the party to whom they are alienated for colonisation fails in achieving his object.

Kauṭilya divides into three classes the sovereigns who propose to take lands for colonisation from the sovereign, of whose dominion the lands form part. The classification is made according as the former are either inferior, equal, or superior to the latter in strength calculated in the way indicated in a former section. So far as can be gathered from the few passages in the Kauṭīliya on this point, two or three of which are of obscure import, a sovereign is advised to dictate terms favourable to him in his transactions with those equal or inferior to him; but not in his dealings with the superior. Difficulties may arise in cases in which the kings, to whom transfer of lands has been made on the condition that they should be returned in case of their failure to settle a colony, refuse to make over the lands to the original


transferor. The steps¹ to be taken are obscurely stated.²

It is noteworthy in this portion of the section that the planting of colonies sometimes formed part of a recognized policy of the state instead of being the result of haphazard migrations of people brought about by some disturbing factors operating on them in their existing habitations. Testimonies of this sort indicating that colonization of lands was undertaken by sovereigns eager to effect peaceful expansion of their territories and further their prosperity are rare in early Indian records, and may serve

¹ The passage states that the lands should be dealt with in a way that would be mentioned in connection with the subject of Pārshnigrāhopgraha. I do not find which passage in the chapter on Pārshnigrāha-chintā applies to the present case. See Kauṭilya, p. 298.

² Kauṭilya adds to the subject of sandhi a classification of the alliances from a different standpoint, the classes being distinguished by express stipulations as to the place, time, and work involved in the alliances. The details of this classification are given in Bk. VII, ch. 6, pp. 279, 280 of the Kauṭilya and need not be recounted here for our purpose.

as a key, that is not often noted, to many of the Hindu migrations and settlements that gradually covered almost the whole of India and even beyond.



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
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
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